Until now, the only method of capturing the lessons learned from these incidents has been "word of mouth" or by studying each individual incident report. Through studying several dozen of these incidents, certain root cause themes are apparent. Scrutinizing these themes could prove to be highly beneficial to future hypergolic system test, checkout, and operational use.
with scarring (in the location where the tissue was significantly exposed), leading to destruction of the small airways and air sacs. Survivors may have varying degrees of permanent restrictive lung disease with pulmonary fibrosis.2 N2O4 and NO2 also have several other unique properties. N2O4 (NOD vapors are approximately three times heavier than air and liquid N 2O4 evaporates about five times faster than water at room temperature. ' The vapors of MON-3 are normally reddish-brown in color, which is caused by rapid vaporization of NO2. Liquid N2O4 and its vapors will explode on contact with hydrazine fuels, amines, and alcohol. Ignition may also occur when N 2O4 comes' into contact with wood, paper, hydrocarbon fuels, and some adhesives. A mixture of N 2O4 and halogenated solvents: carbon tetrachloride, trichloroethylene, perchloroethylene, etc., may produce a violent explosion.' MON-3 N 2O4 (the most commonly used N2O4) has the following properties: 1, 3 
B. Properties of Hydrazine (N2H4) and Monomethylhydrazine (MMH)
Monopropellant grade hydrazine (N 2H4) is the fuel used in the Auxiliary Power Units (APU) on the Space Shuttle Orbiters and the Hydraulic Power Units (HPU) on the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) to generate high pressure gas for hydraulic power of the orbiter's aero surfaces and the SRB's thrust vector control system. N21 14 is also used on many spacecraft for monopropellant rocket propulsion systems (on the order of tenths to hundreds of pounds of thrust per rocket engine). To produce thrust, monopropellant rockets utilize a metal-based agent to catalytically decompose the N2114 into ammonia, nitrogen, and hydrogen. Propellant grade hydrazine contains about 98.5% pure N2114 with the remaining 1.5% being primarily water. Aerozine 50 (along with N 2O4) was used for the first and second stages of the Titan II Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Titan space launch vehicles including the 23G (a variant of the Titan II used for launching medium-sized spacecraft), IIIB, IIIC, and IV. The Titan II, IIIB, IIIC, and IV rockets used the largest quantities of hypergolic propellants per launch in the history of the United States rocket fleet (for the first stage approximately 13,000 gallons of N 2O4 and 11,000 gallons of A-50 were used along with 3,100 gallons of N2O4 and 1,700 gallons of A-50 for the second stage).
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) classify N21 14 and its derivatives as a possible carcinogen. 4 When hydrazine and its derivatives come into contact with tissue, the exposed person will usually suffer from chemical burns unless the liquid is quickly rinsed off the skin using water. N 2114 and its derivatives are extremely toxic, highly flammable, and highly corrosive. "Hydrazines and their vapors explode on contact with strong oxidizers, such as N 2O4i hydrogen peroxide, fluorine, and halogen fluorides. Additionally, they react on contact with metallic oxides, such as iron, copper, lead, manganese, and molybdenum to produce fire or explosion.s3
Hydrazine fires produce little to no smoke or colorful flames. N2H4 has a tendency to react exothermically with or without an oxidizer present (the reaction increases the temperature thus increasing the reaction rate; this is also known as a thermal runaway reaction). Another way to describe a hydrazine thermal runaway reaction is "...the rate of heat generation by the reaction exceeds the rate of heat removal from the system. "6 This process is directly related to the auto-ignition temperature, which decreases as pressure increases. The exothermic reaction can end in an explosion if one or more of the following conditions are met within the system containing the hydrazine: the reacting system is confined to a rigid volume; the reacting system is adiabatic or nearly adiabatic; the reaction rate increases with temperature; or if the hydrazine is subjected to rapid over-pressurization through "water hammer. Monomethylhydrazine is the fuel used in the Orbital Maneuvering System and Reaction Control System (OMS/RCS) on the Space Shuttle Orbiters. Monomethyl-hydrazine, N 2H3(CH3), is similar to hydrazine, N21 14i with the exception that it contains a methyl group in its molecule in place of one hydrogen atom. Propellant grade MMH contains 98% pure N2H3 (CH3) with the remaining 2% being primarily water. MMH is not used for monopropellant rocket propulsion because the carbon formed in its decomposition contaminates the catalyst. It is extremely toxic, highly flammable, and highly corrosive. MMH has , compatibility with metals as compared to N2O4. MMH may have a slight yellow-orange tinted flame. As with N 21 14i MMH can also react exothermically with or without an oxidizer present, but the reaction rate has been found to be much slower than N 2H4. MMH vapor has also been found to be much less sensitive to detonation as compared to N 2H4.6 As a result of the molecular differences in comparison to N2H4, MMH has slightly different properties as shown below:, 3,4,7 
It may seem odd that with all these seemingly negative characteristics (and the large amount of incidents when compared to other commodities), spacecraft designers still choose to use hypergols for propulsion systems. This is primarily due to the fact that hypergols are storable and stable (as long as they are contained properly), have a high specific impulse when used for propulsion, are stable to impact as long as there is no spark, can withstand the extremes of hot and cold which are present in the vacuum of space with fewer controls than cryogenic propellants, and can be frozen and then thawed without detrimental effects to their chemical properties or storage vessels since they contract when frozen. However, care needs to be taken when hypergols are frozen in tubing as this can lead to over-pressurization during thaw (depending on the thaw pattern in the tubing). This is why thermal control of tubing is very important in hypergol systems.
II.
Results and Discussion A total of 45 hypergolic related incidents were studied for the purpose of compiling common lessons learned. Table 1 and Appendix B summarize the fuel and oxidizer incidents; however, it should be noted that if the numbers in Table 1 are summed in a particular category, the resulting value does not equal 45 because some of the incidents involve multiple commodities or root causes, for example. Appendix B clarifies this difference between the total studied incidents and the summation of the numbers in Table 1 .
As shown in Table 1 , the ratio of fuel to oxidizer incidents is approximately one-to-one. Also, the severity (personnel injury or the extent of the hardware damage) was approximately the same when comparing fuel and oxidizer incidents. One key difference between a fuel and an oxidizer incident is that a fuel incident has the potential to become very dangerous quite abruptly as compared to an oxidizer incident because of the potential for fire or explosion. Many of the incidents were directly related to some sort of human error along with the occurrence of the event usually taking place during commodity transfer of commodity or opening of a system. Some examples of human error include ground support equipment (GSE) mis-configurations, incorrect valve cycling, poor design of vehicle or GSE (caused by deficient initial requirements or inadequate acceptance testing), training plans that lack the appropriate content, improper system knowledge, immature or inadequate procedures, and improper system monitoring or situational awareness.
Advance warning (prior to any liquid or vapor release) was available in several of the incidents to the technicians in the vicinity of the spill and/or the engineers that were monitoring from a remote location. The warning indications include off-nominal data (remote or local), off-nominal system characteristics, and/or local changes that occurred without human intervention. Some of these went unnoticed or were ignored during the operation, thus resulting in an incident. There was advance warning in 19 out of 38.total incidents (50% of the time). This percentage does not include spilled fuel as an advance warning of a fire (5 occurrences). Depending on the local environment, there is a reasonable probability that if hydrazine (or one of its derivatives) is spilled, there will be a fire; therefore, the fuel spill itself could be considered an advance warning of a fuel fire. Roughly 42% of the documented fuel spills studied resulted in a fire or explosion. It was unable to be determined if there was an advanced warning for two of the incidents; therefore, they were not included in the above percentage along with the mentioned 5 fuel spills. Some common lessons learned deduced from the various root causes of the studied incidents are shown in the following list. If these items were properly addressed prior to the incidents, prevention may have been possible (in hindsight) or the ramifications of the incident could have been reduced.
• Improper configuration control and internal or external human performance shaping factors can lead to a false comfort level • Vent systems are often neglected and treated as non-hazardous even though they can capture and contain condensed hypergolic liquids (especially in low points) • Aging support hardware should be routinely inspected to reduce the risk of a failure during critical operations • Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur or hardware is damaged o Communication protocols should be pre-coordinated prior to an operation • Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure o Every effort should be made to design out low points in GSE • Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger
• Inadequate knowledge of potential electrostatic discharge hazards while working fuel operations can lead to a fire or explosion • Knowledge of instrumentation error and/or offsets are very important for system oversight • Unknown incompatibilities (from lack of training or research) with propellants can cause surprising failures • If an incident does occur, the system should immediately be placed into a stable configuration;
following this, the procedure should be stopped to assess the problem and its possible ramifications • A heightened amount of situational awareness of technicians and engineers working operations can reduce the risk of an incident and decrease the possibility of injuries or damage if an incident does occur .
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• Improper personal protective equipment, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs • Improper procedural oversight (along with the development of and adherence to the procedure) can be detrimental and quickly lead to an incident o Improper emergency procedures can increase the risk of injuries or hardware damage • Improper local cleanliness or housekeeping (for example iron oxide or rust) can result in fires or explosions • A thorough hypergol system evacuation should be completed (wherever a vacuum is tolerable by the system) prior to the removal or disconnection of any hypergolic propellant fittings o A pulse purge using nitrogen or helium has proven to be inadequate for the removal of residual propellants III. Conclusion Some type of human error can be traced to nearly every studied incident as a root cause, whether it be an error in the design phase or an error prior to or during operational use of hardware containing hypergols. Humans are most definitely not perfect and even when the most knowledgeable personnel are intimately involved in the design phase (vehicle or GSE) or during an operation, mistakes can be made and critical items can be overlooked. One can deduce, however, that most incidents happen during some sort of dynamic operation. Hypergols tend to be very stable in a static configuration (as long as the compatibility characteristics have been well addressed).
Hypergolic rocket propellants have proven to be a highly reliable asset in manned and unmanned spaceflight; however, their maintenance on the ground has proven to be relatively difficult. Do the operational risks from possible human errors or hardware failures causing a catastrophic incident outweigh the usefulness of hypergols even though they have been used for the last 50 years of manned and unmanned spaceflight? One would have to say probably not, since hypergols are so widely used in the space industry currently and are being proposed to be used on many vehicles in the future. Therefore, ground operations on hypergol systems have become increasingly scrutinized for possible unknowns, and rightfully so. The data shown in this report are not an example of why we should not be using hypergolic propellants on spacecraft and launch vehicles, but rather illustrates what we can and should do to mitigate possible unforeseen ground operation and/or design problems.
